








Democracy, Inequality and the Environment 
when Citizens can Mitigate Privately 






Stanley L. Winer 
 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3241 




An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 
• from the CESifo website:            Twww.CESifo-group.org/wpT CESifo Working Paper No. 3241 
 
 
Democracy, Inequality and the Environment 
when Citizens can Mitigate Privately 




We study the political economy of the environment in autocratic, weak and strong 
democracies when individuals can either mitigate the health consequences of domestic 
pollution privately or reduce pollution collectively through public policy. The setting is that of 
a small open economy in which incomes depend importantly on trade in dirty goods, where 
income inequality and the degree to which ordinary citizens exert voice in each dimension of 
the policy process distinguishes elites and ordinary citizens. The recognition that the health 
consequences of pollution can be dealt with privately at a cost adds an important dimension to 
the analysis of the political economy of environmental regulation, especially for an open 
economy. When private mitigation is feasible, inequality of incomes leads to an unequal 
distribution of the health burden of pollution (in accordance with the epidemiologic 
evidence), thus polarizing the interests of citizens in democracies and of ordinary citizens and 
elites in non-democratic regimes. Inequality in the willingness to bear the cost of private 
mitigation in turn interacts with the pollution costs and income benefits of trade in dirty goods 
to further polarize interests concerning both environmental stringency and the regulation of 
trade openness. In this context, we show how the eco-friendliness ranking of different 
political regimes varies with the cost of private mitigation and with the extent of income 
inequality, tending to converge when mitigation costs are high, and even producing a ranking 
reversal between democracies and autocracies, and between weak and strong democracies, 
when costs lie in an intermediate range. 
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1 Introduction
It is well documented that the adverse welfare consequences of pollution are
not borne equally. A recurrent factor explaining this inequality that has
emerged in the epidemiologic literature is socio-economic status: poorer in-
dividuals tend to su®er more from pollution.1 This suggests that although
measures to mitigate the health e®ects of pollution do exist, their cost lim-
its their adoption by everyone. Bottled water, water ¯ltration systems, air
puri¯ers, house location, vacations or medicines are examples of such private
measures.
Although the role of private mitigation has been examined to some extent
in the economics literature,2 its e®ect has been largely neglected in the po-
litical economy literature on environmental policy. In this paper, we study
the political economy of environmental regulation in autocratic, weak and
strong democracies when individuals may mitigate the health consequences
of domestic pollution both privately and collectively through public policy
actions. The economic setting is that of a small open economy in which
domestic incomes depend importantly on the export of dirty goods.
The recognition that the health consequences of pollution can be dealt
with privately at a cost as an alternative to collective action adds an impor-
tant dimension to the analysis of the political economy of the environment,
especially in an open economy. We ¯rst describe how the possibility of pri-
vate mitigation tends to drive a wedge between the interests of low and
high-income individuals regarding public policy towards the environment.
When private mitigation is feasible, inequality of incomes leads to an un-
equal distribution of the health burden of pollution in accordance with the
epidemiologic evidence, thus polarizing interests. Moreover, inequality in the
willingness to bear the cost of private mitigation in turn interacts with the
pollution costs and income bene¯ts of international trade to further polarize
interests concerning environmental stringency and trade openness.
In this context, we investigate how environmental regulation, the regula-
1See Ash and Fetter (2004), Pearce et al. (2006), Brooks and Sethi (1997), Neidell
(2004), Jayachandran (2008) and Evans and Smith (2005) and the reviews of Brunekreef
and Holgate (2002) and O'neill et al. (2003). More anecdotally, news stories about the
higher pollution su®ering among the poorest within developing countries abound (Bernard
(2006), Bradsher and Barboza (2006), French (2005), The Economist (2005)).
2See, for instance, Coase (1960), Shibata and Winrich (1983), McKitrick and Collinge
(2002), Neidell (2009), Hanna (2007), Rosado (2006).2
tion of trade openness and equilibrium levels of pollution vary with the cost
of private mitigation and with income inequality in political regimes of di®er-
ent types. Three types of regimes are investigated and compared. The ¯rst
is an autocratic regime where only a rich elite determines what actions the
government undertakes. The second regime, in contrast, is a strong demo-
cratic one, where the selection of policies responds to political voice exercised
by all citizens. The third, which we refer to as weak democracy, is a regime
where the elite controls one policy dimension, while elected governments have
power only with respect to the other policy dimension. In one case, the rich
elite sets trade openness while the level of environmental regulation is left
to a government that responds to demands by poorer citizens. In the other
case, these roles are reversed.
Comparative analysis highlights the roles of the cost of private mitigation
and of income inequality in shaping the nature of political equilibria. When
the cost of private mitigation is very high, autocratic and strong democracies
adopt the same policies concerning the environment and trade, despite the
fact that the rich elites bear a larger share of the drop in national income.
This stands in contrast to Congleton (1992) who pioneered the study of the
relationship between regime type and environmental control, and who argues
that rich elites in autocratic regimes prefer less regulation.3
At intermediate cost levels - that is, when only the rich can a®ord private
mitigation - an increase in the in°uence of lower income citizens, as occurs in
strong democracies, leads to the adoption of stricter environmental controls.
However, in this case, we show that the multi-dimensionality of the policy
space in elections leads to indeterminacies regarding environmental outcomes
when comparing weak and strong democracies. And when the cost of private
mitigation is low, so that everyone can protect themselves privately to some
extent, we show that a fully democratic regime may adopt laxer environ-
mental policies than an autocratic one because once protected, the poor's
willingness to pay for a cleaner environment becomes low.
Concerning income inequality, we identify various conditions under which
increased inequality leads to a reordering of political regime types in terms
of equilibrium pollution levels. The gist of the argument is based on our
proposition that the willingness to pay for pollution reductions varies non-
3Subsequent contributions include Murdoch et al. (1997), Fredriksson et al. (2005),
Farzin and Bond (2006), Dasgupta et al. (2006) and Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2007).
All point to a somewhat more complex relationship between political institutions and
environmental policy.3
monotonically with income. When rich and poor choose to mitigate equally,
as is more likely to occur under low income inequality, the rich prefer rela-
tively more pollution reductions: An autocracy thus leads to lower pollution
levels than a democracy. But when private mitigation is a luxury that only
the rich can a®ord, as is more likely to happen under high income inequality,
then the rich prefer higher pollution levels than the poor: An autocracy thus
leads to higher pollution levels than a democracy.
It can therefore be seen that higher income is not always associated with
demands for a cleaner environment, the usual normal good prediction. This
may appear to go against the common grain, and in particular to be at odds
with the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis concerning the
relationship between average income and pollution. But in our framework,
income inequality among citizens matters in addition to average national
income. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that demand for a cleaner
environment is not the same as demand for better health, and there tends
to be a disconnect between the two when private mitigation technologies
are available. Our analysis concurs with micro-based evidence provided by
Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) and Kristrom and Riera (1996) to the e®ect
that within a community or country, demand for environmental regulation
can be lower among higher-income individuals.4
Previous work on individual demands for control of the environment typ-
ically uses explanations that depend on di®erences in either the source of
factor income, income levels which a®ect the willingness-to-pay, or an exoge-
nous preference for the environment. The analysis of Eriksson and Persson
(2003) appears to be the only one yet to incorporate the fact that higher
income individuals may be less a®ected by pollution, though it does so in
an exogenous fashion. By making the choice of private mitigation e®ort
endogenous, we can o®er additional insight.
The analysis in the paper is carried out in the context of a small open
economy, where a tari® a®ects the extent of specialization in production of
a dirty good and hence the amount of pollution. There are several reasons
for this modeling choice, one that leads to a framework where there is an
important interaction of mitigation costs and the costs and bene¯ts of trade
that results in the polarization of citizen interests, as we noted above. Many
4See also recent empirical observations that the e®ect of average income on environ-
mental regulation may actually turn negative once one controls for the level of democracy,
including Torras and Boyce (1998), Fredriksson et al. (2005), Farzin and Bond (2006) and
Dasgupta et al. (2006).4
countries are small and open, and in that context we agree with others that
the determination of environmental regulation is bound up with the choice
of trade openness (See, for example, Hillman and Ursprung (1992), Schulze
and Ursprung (2001) and Copeland and Taylor (2003)).5
It should also be noted that in the open economy, where regulation of
trade openness is also an issue in addition to direct regulation of pollution,
the policy space in weak and strong democracies is multi-dimensional. The
resulting analysis leads to interesting ambiguities when it comes to compar-
ing the eco-friendliness of di®erent regimes. Multi-dimensionality introduces
di®erent criteria with which to test which regime is the most eco-friendly
- on direct regulation, or by control of specialization in the production of
dirty goods. The interesting study by Damania et al. (2003), for instance,
compares the ecological performance of various regimes by the stringency of
their environmental regulation. But what if, as in the models explored here,
a weak democracy combines stricter regulation with more openness to trade
in dirty goods?
The paper extends the analysis of Hotte and Winer (2008) to more gen-
eral characterizations of production technologies and consumer preferences,
to a wider range of, and more detailed speci¯cation of political regimes, in-
troduces trade openness as an explicit and continuous policy instrument, and
studies the e®ects of changes in income inequality. It thus provides a richer
set of results. Other noteworthy theoretical enquiries concerning the rela-
tionship of environmental policies and trade openness include Pethig (1976),
Chichilnisky (1994), Copeland and Taylor (1994) and McAusland (2003).
It should be noted that none of these studies considers the role of private
mitigation.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we lay down the basic
features of a small open economy with pollution emissions, environmental
regulation and a trade tari® governing the extent of trade openness. Indi-
vidual welfare functions are introduced in section 3, where we characterize
the optimal choice of e®ort to attenuate the adverse health e®ects of pollu-
5Relatedly, Markusen (2010) argues that in choosing to concentrate on technology and
factor endowment di®erences, trade economists have ignored for too long the link be-
tween preferences and income levels in explaining trade patterns. For instance, Mitra and
Trindade (2005) show that given identical non-homothetic preferences, income distribu-
tion within a country a®ects the trade pattern. In our case, though preferences for traded
goods are homothetic (for ¯xed regulation), trade patterns are still a®ected by income
distribution because of its e®ect on the demands for environmental policies.5
tion as a function of given individual incomes. In section 4, we derive the
general equilibrium e®ects of given pollution regulations and trade openness
on national income and pollution levels. These e®ects are then introduced
into the individual welfare functions, thus allowing for the determination
of private mitigation e®orts in an economic equilibrium. The individually
preferred combinations of public policy and private mitigation e®orts in an
economic equilibrium are then derived as functions of individual national in-
come shares and the cost of mitigation. In section 5, we introduce regimes
di®erentiated by a role for voice for citizens in each policy dimension, and
derive policy equilibria for autocratic, weak and strong democracies, and we
study the e®ects of varying private mitigation costs and income inequality.
Section 6 concludes this investigation of the role of private mitigation in the
political economy of the environment in open economies.
2 The economy
We suppose at the outset that goods fall into one of two categories: clean or
dirty. The di®erence between them occurs at the production stage only. The
clean good (good 1) does not generate any pollution when produced, but a
dirty one (good 2) does.
2.1 The aggregate demand
Clean and dirty goods are undistinguishable when it comes to their consump-
tion. Consumers just prefer more to less, and assign more value to a balanced
basket. Hence, if we let z 2 <+ denote the real national income level, then
this level is achieved by combining the two types of goods in quantities x1
and x2 as per function F(x) ¸ z, x ´ (x1;x2), which is strictly increasing,
strictly quasi-concave and continuous. If p ´ (p1;p2) is the domestic price




fpx j z · F(x)g: (1)
e(p;z) has the usual properties of a cost function. By Shephard's lemma,
the conditional demand for good i is given by xi(p;z) = ei(p;z), where
subscript i denotes the partial derivative with respect to the price of good i.6
6When there is no possibility of confusion, the subscript of a function denotes a partial
derivatives.6
e(p;z) also represents the national nominal expenditure function at income
level z.
2.2 Aggregate supply and pollution
Goods 1 and 2 can be produced either domestically or imported. Let y ´
(y1;y2) denote their domestic production vector. Good 2 generates q(µ) units
of pollution per unit produced, where µ refers to the cleanliness of the pro-
duction technology being used. The ambient pollution level is thus given
by
Q = q(µ)y2; with q(µ) > 0 and q
0(µ) < 0: (2)
Cleaner production is however costly in terms of reduced product in sector
2 as represented by the following output function:
y2 = (1 ¡ µ)f
2(v2); (3)
where v2 denotes an input vector and f2 is the output function for good 2
in the absence of e®orts to control emissions.
The technology and production resources available in the economy are
summarized by the strictly convex production possibility set G(y;µ) · 0. The
gross domestic product (GDP) function at domestic prices is thus de¯ned as
g(p;µ) ´ max
y
fpy j G(y;µ) · 0g: (4)
g(p;µ) has the usual properties of a pro¯t function. By Hotelling's lemma,
we have yi(p;µ) = gi(p;µ).
2.3 The general economic equilibrium
For a small open economy, we have p = (p¤
1 + ¿;p¤
2), where p¤
i is the world
price of good i and ¿ is the tari® per unit of good 1 imported. The imports
of good 1 are given by x1(p;z) ¡ y1(p;µ).
The economy's total earnings { or, equivalently, national nominal income
I { are equal to GDP plus tari® revenues; that is, I = GDP+¿(x1¡y1). With
balanced trade and government budget, the economy's general equilibrium
is fully determined by the following expression:
e(p;z) = g(p;µ) + ¿(x
1(p;z) ¡ y
1(p;µ)): (5)
For ¯xed µ and ¿, z is the sole endogenous variable in expression (5); we can
thus write z = z(µ;¿) and Q = Q(µ;¿).7
3 Individual welfare and private mitigation e®orts
Individual welfare functions are now introduced, and the optimal choice of
e®ort to attenuate the adverse health e®ects of pollution is determined as a
function of given individual incomes. A priori, individuals di®er solely by
the share of the national income that they receive, denoted s.7 We shall refer
to each individual type by his or her income share s.
Following Mayer (1984), we simplify by assuming that tari® revenues are
redistributed neutrally with respect to pre-¯sc income parameter s. Since z
is the only real wealth being created, this implies that individual s gets to
spend sz.
The well-being of individual s depends positively on two variables: a
(pure) consumption level cs and a health condition hs. The health condition
depends negatively on the ambient pollution level Q, but this e®ect can be
individually attenuated with pollution-mitigation e®ort ds.8 The following
function summarizes individual welfare levels:
Us = u(cs) + h(ds;Q): (6)
Function u is strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuous.
Function h has the following binary properties:
h(d;Q) =
½
h0 ¡ ¹ `(Q) if d < d,
h0 ¡ `(Q) otherwise. (7)
Parameter h0 represents the health condition in the absence of pollution
(that is, the best possible health). Functions ` and ¹ ` correspond to the
health deterioration due to pollution, respectively with and without private
mitigation, with ¹ `(Q) > `(Q), ¹ `0(Q) > 0, `
0(Q) > 0 and ¹ `00(Q) > 0, `
00(Q) > 0.
Since d is costly, the choice of private mitigation is really binary: one
either chooses e®ort level d or none at all. The health gain from mitigation
e®ort d is expressed as follows:
¢(Q) ´ ¹ `(Q) ¡ `(Q) > 0: (8)
7Parameter s subsumes the various determinants of income such as innate skills, edu-
cation, or even ability to appropriate existing resources.
8In the literature, private pollution-mitigation e®orts are also referred to as defensive
expenditures and averting e®orts. For more detailed analyzes of its implications for con-
sumer behavior, see Courant and Porter (1981), Shibata and Winrich (1983), Bartik (1988)
and McKitrick and Collinge (2002).8
It is assumed that this health gain increases with the pollution level; that
is, ¢0(Q) > 0. This equivalently implies that the health bene¯t from a
reduction in pollution is lower for those who invest in private mitigation;
that is, ¹ `0(Q) > `
0(Q).
Note that according to expression (7), the private mitigation technology
is summarized by parameter d { a measure of the cost of private mitigation
{ and function ¢(Q) { a measure of its e®ectiveness. Ultimately, both mea-
sures will depend on the type, or mix, of pollutant under consideration.
Real income can be used for either pure consumption or pollution mitiga-
tion. The following budget constraint must therefore be respected: cs+ds =
sz. The individual welfare maximizing problem is expressed as:
max
cs;ds
Us = u(cs) + h(ds;Q); (9)
s.t. cs + ds = sz: (10)
For given z and Q, individual s therefore chooses d¤
s = d if, and only if,
u(sz ¡ d) ¡ `(Q) ¸ u(sz) ¡ ¹ `(Q) or, equivalently,
¢(Q) ¸ u(sz) ¡ u(sz ¡ d): (11)
This inequality says that an individual will spend on private mitigation as
long as the drop in consumption utility does not exceed the gain in health
condition. De¯ning ~ s as the individual who is indi®erent between spending
on private mitigation or not, we have
¢(Q) = u(~ sz) ¡ u(~ sz ¡ d): (12)
With ucc < 0, the right-hand side of (11) is decreasing in s. Consequently,
we have that d¤
s = 0 if s < ~ s and d¤
s = d otherwise and, hence, the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 Private-mitigation e®ort is (weakly) increasing in individual
income shares.
With decreasing marginal utility of consumption, the welfare loss from
spending a ¯xed amount d decreases with income. Given that the health gain
is the same regardless of income, we have the above proposition. Now in the
absence of private mitigation, a decreasing marginal utility of consumption9
makes environmental quality a normal good, as is typically assumed in the
literature on trade and the environment. This is true, in fact, for any ¯xed
private-mitigation e®ort:
Proposition 2 For given ds, the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for
environmental improvements increases with income share s.
Proof: Generally, the utility of an individual s who spends amount ds
on private mitigation and su®ers `(Q) from pollution is given by Us =
u(sz ¡ ds) + h0 ¡ `(Q). Taking the total di®erential and equating it to
zero yields d(sz)=dQ = `0(Q)=uc(sz ¡ds), which corresponds to the MWTP.
Since ucc < 0, the MWTP increases with s for ¯xed ds. ¤
However, introduction of private mitigation blurs the monotonic relation-
ship between income and the demand for environmental quality:
Proposition 3 For a range of income shares directly above ~ s, the marginal
willingness to pay (MWTP) for environmental improvements is lower than
from a range of income shares directly below ~ s.
Proof: From (6) and (7), we have, for all s, ¹ `0(Q)=uc(sz) > `
0(Q)=uc(sz¡d).
By the de¯nition of ~ s, since the inequality is strict and the MWTP is con-
tinuous for given ds, there must exist " > 0 such that for any ± 2 (0;") we
have ¹ `0(Q)=uc((~ s ¡ ±)z) > `
0(Q)=uc((~ s + ±)z ¡ d). ¤
Equation (12) also determines an implicit relationship between ~ s and
variables z, d and Q, which are taken as given at the individual level. It is
easy to verify that ~ s is a decreasing function of z: As the national income
increases, more people engage in private mitigation, ceteris paribus. The
converse holds if d increases: A higher cost of private mitigation reduces
recourse to private mitigation. As for the e®ect of the pollution level, we
obtain that ~ s decreases with Q: With higher pollution, more people invest
in private mitigation.
4 Public policy and individual welfare in an economic equilibrium
The production of good 2 generates pollution, and so trade exacerbates the
pollution problem whenever the country's comparative advantage lies with10
the production of good 2. In this situation, we shall assume that the gov-
ernment can intervene with two policy instruments: It can directly regulate
the cleanliness of the production technology, as summarized by parameter
µ above. Alternatively, it can set the degree of trade openness in order to
attenuate the trade-induced specialisation into dirty good 2.9 Assuming that
the country's comparative advantage lies with the dirty good, the import
tari® de¯ned previously in section 2 acts in this situation as a useful proxy
for trade openness.
To study the links between individual welfare and public policy actions in
the presence of private mitigation, we begin by looking at how given public
policies a®ect the general equilibrium of the economy, and then turn to indi-
vidual welfare in this economic equilibrium. Analysis of political equilibria
comes later.
4.1 The general equilibrium e®ects of (given) environmental and trade po-
lices
Recall that equation (5) de¯nes the implicit relation between z and the pol-
icy instruments. Total di®erentiations with respect to changes in µ and ¿
respectively yield:












Expression (13) indicates that an increase in µ reduces national income
through a decrease in GDP (negative technological e®ect gµ) and a decrease
in tari® revenue as more of good 1 gets locally produced (positive price ef-
fect ¿y1
µ). In the absence of an adjustment in output z, expenditures exceed
income. A decrease in output re-establishes the equilibrium through a re-
duction in expenditures (ezdz) which induces a further reduction in tari®
revenues from a drop in demand for good 1 (x1
zdz).
9We choose those two instruments because they are extensively used in practice and
have been extensively analysed. According to Hueth and Melkonyan (2009), \The regu-
lation of environmental risk is dominated by the use of standards. Although performance
incentives (e.g., Pigouvian taxes and emissions-trading programs) are sometimes employed,
standards remain the core component of environmental and safety regulatory design across
issues ranging from worker safety and hazardous materials control to water and air pollu-
tion mitigation." (Cited in Heyes and Kapur, 2010) Note also that according to the Lerner
symmetry proposition, an import tari® on the clean good has the same e®ect as an export
tax on the dirty good (Corden, 1984).11
In the case of an increase in tari®, note ¯rst that expression (14) makes
use of the fact that dp1 = d¿ for a small open economy. Tari® revenues
decrease because of a fall in imports. This is matched by a decrease in ex-
penditures (ezdz) which induces a further reduction in tari® revenues as the
demand for good 1 drops by x1
zdz.




fF(x) j p1x1 + p2x2 · Ig: (15)
z(p;I) represents the national real output function; it has the usual properties
of an indirect utility function. By Roy's identity, the (ordinary) demand for
good i is given by ~ xi(p;I) = ¡zi(p;I)=zI(p;I). The conditional demand for
good 1 can thus be expressed as x1(p;z) = ~ x1(p;e(p;z)), so that x1
z(p;z) =
~ x1
















(1 ¡ ¿~ x1
I)ez
< 0: (17)
Note that expression 1=(1¡¿~ x1
I) is the tari® multiplier (Jones, 1969) and is
generally assumed to be positive (Anderson and Neary, 2005:33). As for the












1 < 0: (19)
Expressions (16) and (17) correspond to the real national income cost of
each policy, while (18) and (19) are the bene¯ts in terms of lower pollution.
4.2 Public policy and individual welfare in an economic equilibrium
Let ­ generically represent a single policy instrument. Then the individual
welfare e®ect of a marginal change in a policy instrument - either environ-12







0(Q)]Q­; where ­ 2 fµ;¿g: (20)
z­ and Q­ are the economy-wide e®ects identi¯ed in equations (16) to (19).
The terms between square brackets correspond to the respective weights that
each individual assigns to these costs and bene¯ts.
Expression (20) has a convenient economic interpretation in terms of
marginal willingness to pay for environmental improvements expressed in






On the other hand, the national income cost of that unit reduction in pol-
lution, using instrument ­, is given by z­=Q­. Consequently, individual s





which does hold if the derivative in (20) is positive.
Since z­=Q­ is independent of an individual's type, di®erences in inter-
est stem from di®erences in the marginal willingness to pay !s. Through
straightforward algebra, it can be veri¯ed that for d = 0, !s decreases with s
if, and only if, ¾ ´ ¡uccc=uc < 1. This is because an individual with higher
s faces the following tradeo®: on the one hand, he or she incurs a higher
cost of regulation in absolute value; on the other hand, their marginal util-
ity of income is lower.10 If ¾ < 1, the cost e®ect prevails and the marginal
willingness to pay decreases with income share. The opposite holds if ¾ > 1.
Since this trade-o® has been noted and studied elsewhere in the literature,
while our purpose is to point to and study the role of private mitigation when
incomes are not equal, we shall remove the ambiguity by assuming that
¾ = 1.11 The cost e®ect is then exactly o®set by the marginal utility e®ect,
so that in the absence of any private mitigation e®ort, !s is independent of
income share. Any remaining divergence of the interests of citizens of varying
incomes is then driven only by the possibility of private mitigation.
10In a more general context, higher income individuals may also end-up supporting
a higher cost of regulation because they tend to own more capital goods while capital-
intensive goods pollute more, as in Copeland and Taylor (2003, chapter 4) and McAusland
(2003).
11McAuland (2003) provides a detailed analysis of the role of ¾.13
4.3 Environmental regulation and private mitigation
In order to better understand the role played in the economic equilibrium by
the introduction of private mitigation, we now consider the case of two types
of individuals with low and high income shares denoted s and ¹ s respectively.
U0
¹ s and U0
s represent their respective welfare levels in the absence of private
mitigation spending, and given that ¾ = 1, both types then prefer the same
regulation level, denoted µ0.
Ud
¹ s and Ud
s denote the respective welfare levels when both types spend
d on private mitigation. We ¯rst note that with private mitigation, the
preferred level of public environmental control is lower than in its absence
for both types. We have then:
Proposition 4 The preferred environmental regulation level decreases with
private mitigation e®orts.
Proof: In the absence of private mitigation, the preferred mitigation level







With ¾ = 1, this equality is respected for all s. With private mitigation, the
willingness to pay for regulation drops since `
0(Q) < ¹ `0(Q) by assumption
and uc(sz ¡ d) > uc(sz) since ucc < 0. As a result, with private mitigation,
the left-hand side of (23) becomes strictly smaller than the right-hand side
for all s at µ0, which implies that a decrease in regulation raises welfare. ¤
It is important to point out also that for two individuals who invest in
private mitigation, the preferred regulation level is not equal in the pres-
ence of mitigation e®orts. In this respect, we can state the following two
propositions:
Proposition 5 For those who invest in private mitigation, the preferred reg-
ulation level increases with income share.
Proof: Without loss of generality, take two individuals with income shares
¹ s and s, with ¹ s > s. It su±ces to show that with private mitigation, the
willingness to pay for regulation is higher for ¹ s than for s. To this end, we
must simply show that uc(¹ sz ¡ d)¹ s < uc(sz ¡ d)s.14
Let s1z = ¹ sz ¡ d and s2z = sz ¡ d. Since ¾ = 1, we have uc(s1z)s1 =
uc(s2z)s2 or, by substitution, uc(s1z)(¹ s ¡ d=z) = uc(s2z)(s ¡ d=z). Rear-
ranging, we get uc(s1z)¹ s ¡ uc(s2z)s = (uc(s1z) ¡ uc(s2z))d=z < 0. The
latter inequality is due to the fact that ucc < 0 and s1 > s2. Substituting
s1z = ¹ sz ¡ d and s2z = sz ¡ d, we get uc(¹ sz ¡ d)¹ s < uc(sz ¡ d)s. ¤
Proposition 6 A single crossing condition For a given trade tari® (or
degree of trade openness) ¿, the regulation level at which individual s is indif-
ferent between investing in private mitigation or not, denoted ^ µs, if it exists,
is unique.










Consequently, continuous utility functions Ud
s and U0
s can cross only once as
µ varies. ¤
The essence of propositions 4, 5 and 6 is illustrated in ¯gure 1. We present
a case where ^ µs < µd
s and ^ µ¹ s 2 (µd
¹ s;µ0). Hence, the low-income type prefers
not to engage in private mitigation even at the regulation level µd
s, while the
high-income type chooses not to mitigate at µ0 but does so at µd
¹ s.
Thus the possibility of private mitigation drives a wedge between the
interests of the rich and the poor. Both types would prefer regulation level
µ0 if private mitigation were not an option. But with the possibility of
mitigation, the ¯gure illustrates a case where the high-income type overall
prefers lower regulation level µd
¹ s, at which point the welfare of the low-income
type drops compared to his welfare at µ0, a reduction in his welfare that
happens whether or not the low-income person decides to privately mitigate.
4.4 Environmental regulation and trade openness
In order to e±ciently reduce the pollution level, the use of both environmen-
tal regulation and of the import tari® must respect the following equality:
zµ=Qµ = z¿=Q¿. This equality de¯nes an implicit positive relationship be-
















s ^ µs ^ µ¹ s
Figure 1: Income shares and individual interests over environmental regula-
tion
that, given the possibility of private mitigation, this curve does not inform
us about what the e±cient pollution level will (or should) be.
In ¯gure 2, functions µ0(¿) and µd
s(¿) denote the loci of preferred regu-
lation levels for individual s with respect to the tari® rate ¿, respectively
without and with private mitigation. (Keep in mind that in the absence of
private mitigation, the preferred regulation level is independent of individual
type. It is thus not necessary to include subscript s.) They are obtained by




















s;¿) = 0; for ds = d: (25)
Through implicit di®erentiation, one can verify that µ0(¿) and µd
s(¿) are
downward slopping.12 According to proposition 4, we have µd
s(¿) < µ0(¿).
12We assume that the second-order condition is veri¯ed and that functions u and ` are16
Figure 2: Welfare as a function of public policy and private mitigation e®orts17
The loci of the preferred tari® rates are also illustrated as ¿0(µ) and ¿d
s(µ)
and are similarly obtained.
In the absence of private mitigation, welfare reaches a (local) maximum
at the intersection of curves µ0(¿) and ¿0(µ), provided that U0
s(µ;¿) is (lo-
cally) strictly concave, which we assume to be the case.13 This implies that
as µ increases, curve µ0(¿) crosses curve ¿0(µ) from above and the iso-welfare
contour have an ellipse-like shape as illustrated. Given that ds = 0, welfare
decreases as the regulation and tari® combination moves away from (µA;¿A)
in any direction. In the presence of private mitigation, we obtain analogous
properties around point B.14 Finally, coordinate points A and B must fall
on the e±ciency curve ¿e(µ). Indeed, they are characterized by the marginal
willingness to pay being simultaneously equal to zµ=Qµ and z¿=Q¿. We there-
fore have the following propositions:
Proposition 7 The preferred policy combination (µB;¿B) is decreasing in
the cost of private mitigation (d) and increasing in the income share (s).
Proof: The ¯rst part derives from the fact that after spending on private
mitigation, a lower d allows for higher consumption, which results in a higher
willingness to pay for reducing pollution. The second part is a restatement
of proposition 5, generalized to the case of both pollution regulation and a
trade tari®. The proof is a straightforward extension to this case. ¤
4.5 Considering environmental regulation, trade openness and private mit-
igation together
We are now in a position to derive an individual's overall preferred combina-
tion in economic equilibrium of all three variables that can be used to improve
one's health condition: collective action using environmental regulation and
trade openness (the tari®), and private mitigation e®ort.





where it is assumed that U0(µ;¿) and Ud(µ;¿) are both strictly concave.
Coordinate points A and B therefore de¯ne two local maxima and policy
combination (µB
s ;¿B
s ) is preferred to (µA;¿A) if, and only if, the following
su±ciently concave and convex, respectively.
13That is, the Hessian matrix of U0
s(µ;¿) is negative de¯nite at (µA;¿A).
















Whether condition (26) holds depends in part on the magnitude of the
private mitigation cost d. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 8 Let d(s) denote the maximum value for which policy (µB
s ;¿B
s )
is preferred by an individual to (µA;¿A). d(s) exists and is increasing in s.




d) < 0. Existence derives from the continuity properties. The fact that d(s)
is increasing can be shown by ¯rst assuming that (26) holds with equality
for some s. It is then easy to show that the inequality is re-established with
larger s. Hence, d can be further increased while respecting the inequality.
¤
Moreover, given that Ud
s(µd
s(¿);¿)¡U0(µ0(¿);¿) is monotonic decreasing
in ¿ for ¿ 2 (¿B
s ;¿A), there may be cases where the preferred regulation curve
is µd
s(¿) below some threshold value of ~ ¿ 2 (¿B
s ;¿A) and µ0(¿) above that
value. In other words, though private mitigation, with its associated lower
regulation level, may be preferred at low tari® rates (that is, with a high
degree of trade openness), it may not the case at higher rates, as the relative
bene¯ts from private mitigation are reduced. A similar argument holds for
the preferred tari® curve since Ud
s(µ;¿d
s(µ)) ¡ U0
s(µ;¿0(µ)) is decreasing in µ
for µ 2 (µB
s ;µA). This possibility is illustrated in ¯gure 3.
5 Endogenous policy: Political regimes compared
The preceding analysis provides the background for the comparative anal-
ysis of political regimes concerning the choices of environmental regulation
and of trade openness that emerge in a political equilibrium. In conducting
this analysis, we will see that the technology of private mitigation plays an
important but di®erent role in each type of regime.
To proceed further, we ¯rst need to specify more precisely what is meant
by mitigation technology, and then by the nature of political regimes. In






























Figure 3: The decision to reduce private mitigation with higher regulation
or tari®s
5.1 A menu of mitigation technologies
To study the role of mitigation technology, we shall consider four types of
private mitigation technologies ranked according to their cost as follows: d1 <
d2 < d3 < d4. For each cost di, i 2 f1;2;3;4g, there will therefore correspond
a di®erent individually preferred policy combination which is decreasing in i
and increasing in s (see proposition 7). In order to keep track of this, type s's




We assume the di®erent costs of private mitigation to be such that they
yield one or the other of the following outcomes concerning the level of private
mitigation adopted by richer and poorer individuals:20
Prohibitive cost d4: Private mitigation is not a practical option even at
point B in ¯gures 2 or 3 for both rich and for poorer citizens. That is,
U0




High cost d3: The cost is such that option B is preferred to A by type
¹ s, but not s. However, above some given intermediate values of ~ µ 2
(µB
3¹ s;µA) and ~ ¿ 2 (¿B
3¹ s;¿A), the welfare of ¹ s is higher without private
mitigation. Formally, we have Ud
¹ s(µB
3¹ s;¿B
3¹ s) > U0
¹ s(µA;¿A), Ud
¹ s(~ µ;¿d
¹ s(~ µ)) =
U0
¹ s(~ µ;¿0(~ µ)) and Ud
¹ s(µd
¹ s(~ ¿); ~ ¿) = U0
¹ s(µ0(~ ¿); ~ ¿). Consequently, type ¹ s'
preferred tari® curve is ¿d(µ) for µ < ~ µ and ¿0(µ) for µ > ~ µ, and
analogously for the preferred regulation curve. (See ¯gure 3.)
Moderate cost d2: In this case, the cost is such that type ¹ s chooses to
spend on private mitigation at options A, C and D in ¯gure 3, but
type s never does. This implies that Ud
¹ s(µA;¿A) > U0
¹ s(µA;¿A), that the
preferred tari® curve is ¿d
¹ s(µ) for µ · µD
¹ s , and the preferred regulation
curve is µd
¹ s(¿) for ¿ · ¿C
¹ s .
Low cost d1: Both types prefer to spend on private mitigation in a dirtier





Note that except for the low cost case d1, we assume that for individual s,
private mitigation is never chosen. Besides a change in its cost d, we assume
no other change in the properties of the private mitigation function de¯ned
in (7).
5.2 Alternative political regimes
We now turn to detailed speci¯cation of the three types of political regimes
and their associated equilibria. The analysis proceeds by specifying a set of
related but distinct optimization problems that can be conveniently used to
derive the associated policies and pollution level for each regime type. In
this section, policies are described for each regime considered by itself. A
comparative analysis follows later. Again points A to D in ¯gures 2 and 3
are used to illustrate our arguments.
The analysis is simpli¯ed by restricting attention to two income groups,
rich and poor, introduced and analyzed to some extent earlier. This proves
adequate for our purposes, and does not greatly restrict the ability to consider
15Radioactive leakage from a nuclear reactor may ¯t into this category.21
the consequences of increased inequality in a later section. Since there are
two policies, the median voter model does not apply in the fully democratic
case, where a more general spatial voting approach to analysis of equilibrium
is used.16 In the non-democratic regimes, the rich are treated as a dominant
elite, and the poor as ordinary citizens who may or may not vote on some
dimension of public policy.
5.2.1 The autocratic regime
We label as autocratic (AU), a political regime in which a rich elite chooses
both environmental regulation and trade openness unilaterally. Here the
ordinary (poorer) citizen has no voice whatsoever, and government policies








For each private mitigation cost, the resulting political equilibrium choice of
policies is reported in table 1.











Table 1: Mitigation costs and environmental policy in an autocratic regime
In the autocratic regime, the government always chooses policy combina-
tions at the intersection of the high-income group's preferred regulation and
tari® curves. Hence, the policy choices fall on e±ciency curve ¿e(µ). In terms
of pollution level, if we let Qr
i denote the equilibrium pollution level under





4 . The pollution level is highest in the case where
16A similar simpli¯cation is used in other political economy analyses, such as that of
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). In the spatial voting equilibrium, outcomes re°ect a
balancing of heterogeneous interests in the electorate, and the character of that equilibrium
can be investigated well enough in the present context with just two groups.22
the private mitigation cost is low enough to still be adopted by the rich, but
so high that they become reticent to sacri¯ce additional consumption income
through public policies. The pollution level is lowest when private mitigation
is too costly to be adopted by anyone. There is thus a discontinuity in the
relationship between the cost of private mitigation and the resulting pollu-
tion level: pollution initially increases with d and then drops once the cost
of mitigation rises above a threshold value.
As far as ordinary (poorer) citizens are concerned, the autocratic regime
leads to equilibria in which there is too much pollution in intermediate cases
d2 and d3, just the right amount at high cost d4, and too little pollution at
low cost d1. The latter case is driven by the fact that once they adopt private
mitigation, citizens become more reticent than the elite to sacri¯ce more of
their consumption in order to reduce pollution.
It may be noted that the above menu of possibilities illustrates that,
except in the low mitigation cost case, a traditional normal-good based pre-
diction about environmental quality will not provide an adequate explanation
of individual demands for regulation. This is also so for the other regimes
considered below.
5.2.2 Strong Democracy
We de¯ne a strong democratic regime (SD) to be one in which a political
equilibrium can be represented by maximizing a weighted sum of utilities of






¹ s(µ;¿) + (1 ¡ °)U
¤
s(µ;¿); (28)
where ° denotes the relative in°uence weight of the high-income-share group
in the political equilibrium. This model of a fully democratic state makes
use of the well-known Representation Theorem that shows how spatial voting
equilibria can be calculated using a synthetic optimization problem like (28)
- see for example, Couglin (1992) and Hettich and Winer (1999). Note that
the objective in (28) is not a social welfare function. The particular weights
in it, as well as its functional form, are determined by the nature of the Nash
political equilibrium. They are not chosen as part of a social plan.
The intuition behind the theorem is that when voting behavior depends
only on how citizens think that parties attend to their individual well-being,
strong political competition forces each party to move towards the Pareto23
frontier or risk losing votes to an opposition that can promise more welfare for
politically sensitive groups of voters (with relatively high °) without reducing
the welfare of others.
In the present environmental context, equilibrium in a strong democracy
always involves a policy combination located along the pollution e±ciency
curve ¿e(µ). Hence, the political equilibrium of the fully democratic govern-
ment is characterized by
° fuc(c
¤
¹ s)¹ s[zµ + z¿¿
e0(µ)] + hQ(d
¤













The terms between square brackets denote general equilibrium e®ects in
terms of national income and pollution changes, and are multiplied by the
respective individual sensitivities ucs and hQ. This means, for instance, that
even in a situation where the poor wield little direct political clout - that is
(1¡°) is small - they may still have a signi¯cant impact on the equilibrium
policy of a democratic government if their individual sensitivities to pollution
are much higher than those of the higher income individuals, because this
a®ects their voting behavior.
The resulting political equilibrium choice of policies are reported in table
2.
Mitigation cost Policy equilibrium µ(°)
d1 on ¿e(µ) with µ(°) 2 (µB
1s;µB
1¹ s) and µ0(°) > 0
d2 on ¿e(µ) with µ(°) 2 (µB
2¹ s;µA) and µ0(°) < 0
d3 on ¿e(µ) with µ(°) 2 (µB
3¹ s;µA) and µ0(°) < 0
d4 (µA;¿A)
Table 2: Mitigation costs and environmental policy in a strong democratic
regime
At prohibitive cost d4, the equilibrium policy coincides with both group's
preferred policy combination and the pollution level is lowest.
At intermediate cost levels d2 and d3, the policy outcome is located be-
tween points B¹ s and A somewhere along the e±ciency curve and moves up
from B¹ s towards A as the in°uence of the poor (1 ¡ °) increases. The
movement is continuous in the case of d2. With d3, however, there is a dis-
continuity in policy equilibrium µ(°). Indeed, the democratic government24
chooses a policy along curve ¿e(µ) that increases continuously from µB
¹ s to ~ µ
as ° initially decreases from 1. But for all in°uence values below the one
that yields equilibrium policy ~ µ, the policy outcome is (µA;¿A).
At lost cost d1, equilibrium policies now fall between points Bs and B¹ s
and moves down from B¹ s towards Bs as the in°uence of the poor increases.
As far as the pollution level is concerned, we obtain that under democracy,
the pollution level is lowest when the cost of private mitigation is prohibitively
high, just as in the case of an autocratic regime; it increases with the in°uence
of the rich at intermediate mitigation cost levels; while it increases with the
in°uence of the poor at low mitigation cost levels.
5.2.3 The weak democracy
The strong or fully democratic regime de¯ned above assumes that all citizens
vote in a manner that takes into account both policy dimensions, and political
platforms are shaped accordingly. But this will not be so in all democratic
contexts. Rodrik (1992), for instance, investigates situations of what he
calls subordinate government in which a rich elite leads by setting some
policies, with a democratically elected (but subordinate) government acting
as a follower in setting other policies. Besley and Burgess (2002) argue that
in°uence is linked to the availability of information about policies, and that
politicians may exploit the fact that the poor are often not well informed
about some of their actions. Damania, Fredriksson and List (2004) propose
a model in which there is an interaction between the choice of trade tari® and
environmental taxation which is dependent on the corruption level. Because
of corruption, producers gain in°uence over environmental policies.17 List
and Sturm (2006) classify policy issues as either \frontline" or \secondary"
and develop models where the voter's e®ective in°uence varies across issues.
Although the justi¯cations may vary, a fundamental consequence of these
and many other analogous situations is that some citizens may control as-
pects of public policy in nominally democratic regimes to a greater extent
than others. This situation has important implications in the environmental
17This story is reminiscent of arguments heard in Costa Rica by one author during
the summer of 2007 leading up to an October referendum on a free trade agreement
with Central America and the USA. Many believed that due to corrupt civil servants and
politicians, Costa Rica would not be able to retain high environmental and labor standards
once opened to trade, unlike Canada with NAFTA. Hence, though they could in°uence
trade policy through a referendum, many felt that they would lose in°uence over social
policies.25
Mitigation cost Policy equilibrium




Table 3: Mitigation costs and environmental policy in a weak democracy
context. To see why, we may consider the following two polar cases: (1)
The high-income group, or elite, sets the degree of environmental regulation
stringency, while the government, responding to the mass of (lower income)
voters, chooses the degree of trade openness; (2) The high-income elite sets
the tari®, and lower income voters as a group e®ectively choose the degree
of environmental regulation.
In either case, the outcome is modeled as a Nash equilibrium choice of
policy. In case 1, the equilibrium policies fall at the intersection between the
elite's preferred environmental regulation curve and the low income voters'
preferred tari® curve. In case 2, the equilibrium policy outcome falls at the
intersection between the high income group's preferred trade tari® curve and
the low income group's preferred environmental regulation curve.
Table 3 reports the political equilibria corresponding to each mitigation
cost level. (Low cost d1 is omitted for brevity.)
As in the autocracy and democracy cases, with high mitigation cost d4,
we still ¯nd political equilibria at the most stringent policies (µA;¿A). Both
groups' preferred policy combinations are perfectly aligned and pollution is
lowest.
With d3, the equilibrium is also at (µA;¿A). One can indeed verify that
for each case, the respectively preferred regulation and tari® curves cross at
point A only. In the Nash setting, the reason is as follows: If the rich set a
low regulation level while buying private mitigation, the poor, who cannot
a®ord to mitigate, react by voting for a government that adopts a high tari®
rate. But at the high tari® rate, the rich prefer to forgo private mitigation
and replace it with increased regulation. The poor then react by `choosing'
a somewhat lower tari® rate. And so on. With the help of ¯gure 3, one can
verify that there is a convergence towards point A, which constitutes a stable
and unique equilibrium for both heterogeneous in°uence cases 1 and 2.
When the cost of mitigation drops to d2, however, the rich always choose26
to mitigate. As a result, in case 1, they set a low regulation level, to which
the government responding to ordinary (poorer) citizens reacts by choosing a
high tari® rate at equilibrium point C. In case 2, the relevant policy curve for
the high-income group is ¿d
¹ s(µ) while that of the low-income group is µ0(¿).
The policy outcome is at point D with a high regulation level and a low tari®
rate.18
5.3 A comparative analysis
We ¯rst observe that when private mitigation is prohibitively costly, equilib-
rium public policy choices are not a®ected by the nature of the regime. The
interests of both income groups coincide in the absence of private mitiga-
tion.19 Everyone wants to rely entirely on public policy to reduce pollution.
The resulting pollution level is the lowest in all regimes types, and the pollu-
tion burden is distributed equally across individuals because no one privately
mitigates.
At the other end of the private mitigation cost spectrum, when mitigation
costs are low so that both rich and poor prefer to adopt private mitigation
and reduce the level of public regulation, regime type matters. Just as in
the standard normal good case, the rich want stricter public policies than
the poor. An autocratic regime may thus adopt more stringent policies than
will a democratic one in which the poor pressure the government for less
regulation and hence more income. We thus obtain that an autocratic gov-
ernment is more eco-friendly than a democratic one and the pollution burden
is equally distributed.
At intermediate private mitigation cost levels, the rich prefer to privately
mitigate and advocate lax public policies while the poor prefer not to pri-
vately mitigate, and to push for more stringent public policy. Contrary to the
low-cost case, environmental quality is not a normal good anymore. Autoc-
racy therefore leads to a highly polluted environment, with the poor being en-
tirely exposed. The strong democracy adopts generally more stringent public
policies, with pollution levels declining as the in°uence of the poor increases.
18This result is consistent with the empirical work of Damania, Fredriksson and List
(2003), who ¯nd that in more corrupt countries, trade openness is positively linked to
stringency of regulation regarding lead in gasoline.
19Recall that though the rich pay more for public policies, they also have a lower
marginal utility of income. We assumed that both e®ects cancel out as income share
increases.27
In these intermediate cases, strong democracy is more eco-friendly than au-
tocracy. The pollution burden is unequally distributed for both regime types,
but the poor su®er more from pollution under an autocratic government.
In weak democracies, a relatively high intermediate mitigation cost level
d3 (when mitigation is expensive for the rich but still feasible) leads to an
equilibrium with stringent public policies and low pollution while in autoc-
racy this leads to the opposite. In terms of the pollution level, the strong
democratic case falls in-between the autocracy and the weak democracy
cases. This result is due to the fact that in weak democracies, if the rich
try to lower the level of public intervention in one dimension and privately
mitigate, the poor will compensate with a high level in the other, since they
cannot privately mitigate. This, in turn, makes private mitigation less at-
tractive to the rich. In anticipation, since mitigation is relatively costly, the
rich also turn to public policies without private mitigation.
Things are di®erent with relatively low intermediate mitigation costs. In
such cases, we cannot compare directly the level of pollution between a weak
democracy and either strong democracy or autocracy. If the rich control
the regulation level in a weak democracy, for instance, they will set it low
and buy private mitigation. Being fully exposed to pollution, poorer citizens
pressure the government to react with a high tari® rate. Since the two public
policy instruments move in opposite directions, we cannot say whether the
resulting pollution level is lower or higher than in the other, purer regimes.
As a whole, these comparisons establish clearly that the cost of private
mitigation is a critical determinate of di®erences in policy equilibria across
regime types. Di®erences across regimes in environmental policies and pol-
lution levels are most evident for types of pollution that can be addressed
partially or fully via private mitigation.
5.4 The E®ect of Increased Income Inequality
The foregoing analysis allows us to make predictions about how democracy
a®ects changes in environmental stringency when income inequality increases.
For brevity, we shall compare the cases of autocracy and strong democracy
only.
We de¯ne an increase in inequality as a strictly higher income share for the
rich (¢+¹ s) and a strictly lower income share for the poor (¢¡s). Population
sizes and relative political in°uence in°uence weights are, as before, assumed
constant. Depending on the initial values of d, ¹ s and s, we may distinguish28
two possible scenarios.
Scenario 1: Suppose that initially, when income inequality is relatively
low, both income groups prefer overall policy combination (µA;¿A) in ¯gure
2. This means that both groups have the same interests in public policy
because they both prefer stringent environmental policies while saving on
private mitigation costs. Autocratic and democratic regimes will thus yield
the same policy outcomes.
Given proposition 1, an increase in ¹ s will eventually lead the rich to
switch to private mitigation. The rich then prefer less stringent public poli-
cies at (µB
¹ s ;¿B
¹ s ). Whether the political regime is of the autocratic or strong
democratic type, increased inequality therefore leads to laxer environmental
policies. However, since the poor still exert some in°uence in a democratic
regime, the extent of the reduction in government action (due to increased
inequality) is less marked under democracy.
But the story does not end there. According to proposition 7, once the
rich can a®ord private mitigation, further increases in ¹ s cause them to prefer
more stringent environmental policies. Regardless of the political regime,
we then have the opposite result that increased inequality beyond this point
leads to a cleaner environment.
Scenario 2: Suppose that initially, and in contrast to the ¯rst scenario,
when income inequality is relatively low, individuals in both groups prefer
to privately mitigate. In accordance with proposition 7, the rich then prefer
more stringent regulation than the poor.
Further increases in inequality lead the poor to demand less stringent
environmental policies as long as they still choose to privately mitigate. The
rich, on the other hand, want more stringent environmental policies. In an
autocratic regime, this leads to more stringent policy. In a strong democracy,
in contrast, the outcome is indeterminate as each group pulls di®erent policies
in opposite directions.
But according to proposition 7, further increases in inequality will even-
tually lead the poor to prefer stricter environmental policies while forgoing
private mitigation. When that takes place, their preference jumps from being
less stringent to being more stringent than that of the elite. This makes little
di®erence under an autocratic regime as the rich still choose to privately miti-
gate. But in a fully democratic one, increased inequality then unambiguously29
leads to the adoption of more stringent environmental policies.
In general, we see that the e®ects on the nature of environmental regu-
lation of increased inequality depend on initial conditions, and are nonlinear
in the extent of the change in the distribution of incomes. This analysis
indicates that empirical work on the relationship of inequality and environ-
mental policy will be complex, and it is easy to see why imperfect controls
in a regression equation may lead to a wide variety of results.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the roles of private mitigation and income
inequality in the political economy of the environment. While richer citizens
may prefer the use of a private defence against pollution and the higher in-
come that comes from specialization and trade in dirty goods, poorer citizens
may prefer collective intervention in order to reduce their exposure. Income
inequality, whatever its source, causes divergence of interests because of the
feasibility of private mitigation as an alternative to collective action. This
divergence of interests is exacerbated by trade, since specialization in dirty
production generates pollution as well as higher incomes.
Equilibria in three types of regimes are compared: autocratic, weak and
strong democracies. In autocracy, only a rich elite decides on the course of
government policy. In contrast, in strong democracies all citizens exercise
voice in the setting of both policy instruments - the degree of regulation
of emissions, and the degree of trade openness (via an import tari®) which
a®ects the degree of specialization of the economy in dirty production. In
the weak democracy, the elite is decisive on one dimension of most interest
to it, while a weak government responds as best it can to citizen demands
concerning the remaining policy issue.
The equilibria in these regimes are modeled using a sequence of appro-
priate, related optimization problems, and are distinguished by the in°uence
exercised by ordinary (poorer) citizens in each of the two key policy di-
mensions. The multi-dimensional nature of the issue space allows for the
possibility of variation in the in°uence of each group with each policy dimen-
sion, a realistic feature of our model that sometimes leads to di±culties in
comparing the eco-friendliness of di®erent regimes.
We show that the divergence of interests is most acute and the di®erence
across regimes most marked when existing technology (or the type of pollu-
tion) provides for intermediate or low levels of the cost of private mitigation.30
When the cost of mitigation is very high, divergence of interests in the pop-
ulation is reduced and political outcomes across regimes tends to converge.
When the cost of privately mitigating is very high, both rich elites and or-
dinary citizens prefer collective action to deal with pollution, and the health
consequences pollution will be equally distributed across the population even
in an autocracy.
In the intermediate cost cases, when the rich, or the elite, can a®ord to
mitigate the consequences of pollution more than ordinary citizens, policy
outcomes diverge substantially with the type of regime. It is possible that
the elite in non-democratic regimes will adopt both tight environmental reg-
ulations along with a high level of trade openness, a political outcome that
lies outside of the fully democratic arena, and that may possibly be quali¯ed
as environmentally friendly.
We also compare regimes with respect to the level of pollution gener-
ated. Although democracy is less generally polluting than autocracy, because
poorer citizens exercise in°uence in a strong democracy and cannot a®ord to
mitigate privately to the same extent, our analysis indicates that when the
rich exert heavy in°uence in a fully democratic state, weak democracies may
do better.
We conclude by restating the central theme of the paper: acknowledging
the possibility of privately mitigating the health consequences of pollution at
a cost has important consequences for the study of the political economy of
the environment.
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